The incest taboo?
A reconsideration of Westermarck
Gregory C. Leavitt

Beyond the Taboo: Imaging Incest
Anna Meigs and Kathleen Barlow
American Anthropologist
New Series, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Mar., 2002), pp. 38-49
(article consists of 12 pages)

Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction.
1 But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored

plainl english introduction to the ideas of Freud & Jung on Myth.

The psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan poses some particular problems for explication because it is primarily a synchronic scheme, while it must inevitably be explored diachronically. That is, while Lacan had increasing recourse to topologies depicting everything from the fundamental series of forces that shape and deform subjectivity to the core movement of desire which constitutes the essence of subjective being, even he had to supplement these often enigmatic diagrams with narrative commentary. This pressure is even more inevitable for the commentator at the second or third degree of remove from the original thought. Thus, in the absence of a sudden capacity to produce a full-blown and immediately comprehensible explication on the spot, I will simply begin my diachronic exploration of the fundamental structures of Lacan’s psychoanalysis with the caveat that unless otherwise explicitly stated, the phenomena I define are to be thought of first as structures and only secondarily (if at all) as processes.

My name is Zach Elwood. I’ve got a book on poker tells and live poker psychology coming out near the end of 2011. It will be called ‘Reading Poker Tells’. You can check out my Twitter account at @apokerplayer or email me at info (at) readingpokertells.com.

I’ve always been primarily interested in the psychological aspects of poker. I like studying people, figuring out their personal strategies and tendencies, and trying to use that knowledge to my advantage. I love calling a big bluff, betting someone off a hand when I sense weakness, and reading the psychological ebb and flow of individual players and the game as a whole. I think poker is a tremendously deep game; the more I have studied it, the more psychological complexity I find.

The Queen Mary Centre for the History of the Emotions was set up in 2008 to bring together scholars, writers and artists exploring the ways our feelings have changed over time.

The idea for a blog arose because members of the Centre were keen to find a medium for sharing their ideas with a wider public, responding quickly to current events and inviting the contributions of others.

From reflections on contemporary politics of feeling (Cameron’s Happiness Index anyone?), to quirky microhistories in the Museum of the Emotions, this blog is a collective endeavour in which we put our attitudes towards emotions - and explanations for why we have them at all – into historical context.

We hope you enjoy reading and participating in it. If you would like to contribute, don’t hesitate to get in touch.

Thomas Dixon and Tiffany Watt-Smith

The postings are meant to provide topical additions, comments, and reactions to relevant developments since the publication of The Imprinted Brain. They also provide an opportunity to answer critics, correct errors, draw attention to relevant research, and to post suggestions which may be important in the future.