"Civil wars cluster in space as well as time. In this study, we develop and evaluate empirically alternative explanations for this observed clustering. We consider whether the spatial pattern of intrastate conflict simply stems from a similar distribution of relevant country attributes or whether conflicts indeed constitute a threat to other proximate states. Our results strongly suggest that there is a genuine neighborhood effect of armed conflict, over and beyond what individual country characteristics can account for. We then examine whether the risk of contagion depends on the degree of exposure to proximate conflicts. Contrary to common expectations, this appears not to be the case. Rather, we find that conflict is more likely when there are ethnic ties to groups in a neighboring conflict and that contagion is primarily a feature of separatist conflicts. This suggests that transnational ethnic linkages constitute a central mechanism of conflict contagion."

"Replication files":
http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/data/shocks-conflict/Bazzi-Blattman.zip?9d7bd4

"Taking issue with the common sense view that 'human nature' is violent, Keane shows why mature democracies do not wage war upon each other, and why they are unusually sensitive to violence. He argues that we need to think more discriminatingly about the origins of violence, its consequences, its uses and remedies. He probes the disputed meanings of the term violence, and asks why violence is the greatest enemy of democracy, and why today's global 'triangle of violence' is tempting politicians to invoke undemocratic emergency powers. Throughout, Keane gives prominence to ethical questions, such as the circumstances in which violence can be justified, and argues that violent behaviour and means of violence can and should be 'democratised' - made publicly accountable to others, so encouraging efforts to erase surplus violence from the world."

"examines more than two hundred cases of forcible regime promotion over the past five centuries, offering the first systematic study of this common state practice. He looks at conflicts between Catholicism and Protestantism between 1520 and the 1680s; republicanism and monarchy between 1770 and 1850; and communism, fascism, and liberal democracy from 1917 until the late 1980s...."

"Kaplan is merely highlighting the fundamental difference between neoconservative thinking and thinking undertaken by people with a moral compass. As Alex Massie says, present-day Europe’s state of peace, prosperity, and physical security is a good thing. Neoconservatives, however, see war and death as good things. Irving Kristol told Corey Robin that market-oriented conservatism is too “boring” (”The notion of devoting your life to it is horrifying if only because it’s so repetitious. It’s like sex.”) so you need to inject some death and destruction into the mix to keep things interesting.

The world would be a better place if people looking for cheap thrills would stick to the black metal scene or maybe take up extreme sports rather than foreign policy punditry. But the point is that it’s extremely dangerous to take advice from people with this mindset—they’re not even trying to enhance the country’s security, they’re trying to embroil the country in wars."

Oh sweet heaven no: "We develop a theory of interstate conflict in which the degree of genealogical relatedness between populations has a positive effect on their conflict propensities because more closely related populations, on average, tend to interact more and develop more disputes over sets of common issues. We examine the empirical relationship between the occurrence of interstate conflicts and the degree of relatedness between countries, showing that populations that are genetically closer are more prone to go to war with each other, even after controlling for a wide set of measures of geographic distance and other factors that affect conflict, including measures of trade and democracy."

"Then I tried to pry the grenade out of [my] dead fist with my other hand..." The LBJ quote in the first comment is great, too; that would've made for an interesting history.

Eric Rauchway describes, with excerpts, an essay by on this subject by Maurice Bloch, with illustrations from WWI. Sounds astonishingly like Dan Sperber, only with an unfortunate collectivist overlay.

"examines the emergence during the early modern era of mathematicians, chemists, and natural philosophers who, along with military engineers, navigators, and artillery officers, followed in the footsteps of Archimedes and synthesized scientific theory and military practice. It is the first collaborative scholarly assessment of these early military-scientific relationships ... investigates the deep connections between two central manifestations of Western power, examining the military context of the Scientific Revolution and the scientific context of the Military Revolution. Unlike the classic narratives of the Scientific Revolution that focus on the theories of, and conflicts between, Aristotelian and Platonic worldviews, ... highlights the emergence of the Archimedean ideal—... a symbiosis ... between the supply of mechanistic science and the demand for military capability. "

Sounds splendidly cracked (and anyway didn't DeLanda do this already?)

"Beginning with the Scientific Revolution and concluding with today's terrorist networks, Antoine J. Bousquet advances a novel history of scientific methodology in the context of the battlefield. ... Marked by an increasingly tight symbiosis between technology, science, and conflict, the constitution and perpetuation of this scientific way of warfare are best understood as an attempt by the state to turn violent aggression into a rational instrument of policy. In his study, Bousquet explores the relative benefits (such a unique chain of command to safeguard the use of nuclear weapons) and decentralizing (such as the flexible networks that connect insurgents) military affairs. He then follows with specific scientific approaches to war: mechanistic, thermodynamic, cybernetic, and "chaoplexic," a network-centric theory allied with the non-linear sciences."

How Europeans got to be so good at killing people.

A teaser for the book _Remnants of War_, arguing that most major violent conflict is now the work of "surprisingly small" bands of thugs, and amendable to policing.

RIP one of the great social scientists of our time.

The astonishing news is that territorial ethnic conflict requires the geographic proximity of (self-perceived) ethnic groups, and is rare in locales where one group is an overwhelming majority. The attention paid here seems due to a computational version

Fuck, fuck, fuck.

"Network-centric warfare": not actually any good at dealing with a decentralized opponent. (Oh, the DARPA meetings I sat through about "joint battlespace 2020"...)

On reading Homer in Vietnam