Rajiv Sethi: The Countrywide Complaint and the Capitalization of Trust
february 2012 by cshalizi
"distrust of traditional lending institutions such as commercial banks led some borrowers to seek out brokers from their own communities whom they felt they could trust. But these brokers were operating under high-powered incentives to inflate rates and fees and guide borrowers towards subprime products even when they were eligible for cheaper alternatives. The trust that was placed in the brokers allowed them greater flexibility to respond to these incentives and left borrowers worse off than the would have been if they had been more suspicious or better aware of the incentive structures in place.
"Viewed in this manner, the subprime saga has some broader implications. From the point of view of a company operating in multiple local markets with a diverse customer base, the strategy of giving local employees or contractors the discretion to adjust prices can be very profitable. This is especially so if these employees appear trustworthy to their customers, but are not in fact deserving of such trust. As Groucho Marx is reputed to have said: 'The secret of life is honesty and fair-dealing. If you can fake that you've got it made.' For products involving frequent repeat purchases by the same customer, reputation effects and competition can limit the degree of price discrimination. But the purchase of a home is an infrequent transaction for most people, and the complexity of the loan product precludes easy comparison with alternatives on offer. Trust then becomes a key determinant of pricing and transaction volume, especially when strong and hidden incentives for the betrayal of trust are in place.
"Betrayal also leads to the erosion of trust over time. It could be argued that trust is one of our most valuable public goods, substantially lowering the costs of transacting. In the complete absence of trust, the resources that would need to be devoted to monitoring would be prohibitive and many organizations and markets would simply not exist. Trust also comes naturally to most of us, based on simple cues such as those revealed in Reid's interviews. High-powered incentives to secure and then betray such trust are therefore costly not just to the immediate victim, but also to the community at large. This may be one of the less visible consequences of the subprime crisis."
mortgage_crisis
fraud
trust
social_networks
economics
market_failures_in_everything
"Viewed in this manner, the subprime saga has some broader implications. From the point of view of a company operating in multiple local markets with a diverse customer base, the strategy of giving local employees or contractors the discretion to adjust prices can be very profitable. This is especially so if these employees appear trustworthy to their customers, but are not in fact deserving of such trust. As Groucho Marx is reputed to have said: 'The secret of life is honesty and fair-dealing. If you can fake that you've got it made.' For products involving frequent repeat purchases by the same customer, reputation effects and competition can limit the degree of price discrimination. But the purchase of a home is an infrequent transaction for most people, and the complexity of the loan product precludes easy comparison with alternatives on offer. Trust then becomes a key determinant of pricing and transaction volume, especially when strong and hidden incentives for the betrayal of trust are in place.
"Betrayal also leads to the erosion of trust over time. It could be argued that trust is one of our most valuable public goods, substantially lowering the costs of transacting. In the complete absence of trust, the resources that would need to be devoted to monitoring would be prohibitive and many organizations and markets would simply not exist. Trust also comes naturally to most of us, based on simple cues such as those revealed in Reid's interviews. High-powered incentives to secure and then betray such trust are therefore costly not just to the immediate victim, but also to the community at large. This may be one of the less visible consequences of the subprime crisis."
february 2012 by cshalizi
The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin
november 2011 by cshalizi
Interesting as a case study in economic sociology, though none of the participants seem to be equipped to recognize this.
(Predictably, the comments section is full of hurt bitcoin boosters.)
money
networked_life
economics
financial_speculation
trust
banking
via:kjhealy
(Predictably, the comments section is full of hurt bitcoin boosters.)
november 2011 by cshalizi
Railtrack and the Joint-Action Society at Vukutu
august 2010 by cshalizi
"Most work for most people in the developed world is about coordinating their actions with those of others – colleagues, partners, underlings, bosses, customers, distributors, suppliers, publicists, regulators .... Information collection and transfer, while often important and sometimes essential to the co-ordination of actions, is not usually itself the main game." Consequently, we have not an "Information Society" but a "Joint-Action Society, although this does not quite capture all that is intended." Resonates oddly with the recent Cuff, Permuter and Cover paper on "coordination capacity".
information_society
institutions
collective_cognition
collective_action
trust
market_failures_in_everything
august 2010 by cshalizi
A crisis of trust? « Soft Machines
october 2009 by cshalizi
"Trust in science at all-time high"
trust
science_in_society
to:blog
october 2009 by cshalizi
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