Despite my presence on the program, this should actually be really good.

"Scientific theory choice is guided by judgments of simplicity, a bias frequently referred to as "Ockham's Razor". But what is simplicity and how, if at all, does it help science find the truth?  Should we view simple theories as means for obtaining accurate predictions, as classical statisticians recommend?  Or should we believe the theories themselves, as Bayesian methods seem to justify?  The aim of this workshop is to re-examine the foundations of Ockham's razor, with a firm focus on the connections, if any, between simplicity and truth. "

"a new approach to the epistemological and methodological doctrines of the leading experimental philosophers of seventeenth-century England, an approach that considers their often overlooked moral, psychological, and theological elements. Corneanu focuses on the views about the pursuit of knowledge in the writings of Robert Boyle and John Locke, as well as in those of several of their influences, including Francis Bacon and the early Royal Society virtuosi. She argues that their experimental programs of inquiry fulfill the role of regimens for curing, ordering, and educating the mind toward an ethical purpose, an idea she tracks back to the ancient tradition of cultura animi. "

Possibly interesting, but the sample chapter is so full of transcription errors that I can't read it.

I'll have to miss this, since I'll be teaching and otherwise working, but it looks very interesting.

"Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning more facts, we extend our inductive reach by supplying more localized inductive inference schemes. Since a material theory no longer separates the factual and schematic parts of an induction, it proves not to be vulnerable to Hume’s problem of the justification of induction."

What I find fascinating here is that the right-wing position is one of full-blown social (or more exactly, institutional) relativism and performativity: that "he's guilty" means not "actually, as a matter of fact, he broke the law" but "after following the prescribed rituals, our courts have declared him 'guilty'." Unfortunately, the place this took me next was Judith Butler/Antonin Scalia slash-fic, and I need to scrub out my brain now.

... in which pragmatism returns to its roots in the lab, apparently.

Full text!

"A knowledge-based system decides how to act by running formal reasoning procedures over a body of explicitly represented knowledge—a knowledge base. The system is not programmed for specific tasks; rather, it is told what it needs to know and expected to infer the rest. This book is about the logic of such knowledge bases. It describes in detail the relationship between symbolic representations of knowledge and abstract states of knowledge..."

"[I]n spite of its intuitive appeal, how could Ockham's razor help one find the true theory? For, in an updated version of Plato's Meno paradox, if we already know that the truth is simple, we don't need Ockham's help. And if we don't already know that the truth is simple, what entitles us to assume that it is?

... It is hopeless to provide an a priori explanation how simplicity points at the truth immediately, since the truth may depend upon subtle empirical effects that have not yet been observed or even conceived of. The best that Ockham's razor could guarantee a priori is to keep us on the straightest possible path to the truth, allowing for unavoidable twists and turns along the way as new effects are discovered. In fact, it is possible to define empirical simplicity and efficient convergence to the truth so that Ockham’s razor is the uniquely most efficient strategy for converging to the truth. "

Query to self: does this sort of deflation of the claim "science gives us the truth" (by using Tarski to turn that into the OR of lots of claims like "science says that the earth circles the sun, and it does") still work counterfactually? That is, if the Sun _did_ go around the Earth, presumably scientists could figure that out... (Cf. Kevin Kelly, _Logic of Reliable Inquiry_.)

C'mon, Clark, tell us how you _really_ feel.

Review by Kevin Kelly (the smart one) and Conor Mayo-Wilson. Politely damning.

On the one hand, on specific points of ancient history Lefkowitz seemed (& seems) to me to be right. But _her_ work was also politicized...

Only papers, not books.

A non-circular explanation of why Ockham's Razor works: a preference for simple theories helps us converge to the truth _faster_, even when the truth is complex.

The search for the historical truth likened to the search for the car keys.

Timothy Burke saves me from reading a book. Thank, Tim!