'The final antidote to false morality' -- "Contempt is the feeling that is provided by you when somebody is attempting to exploit you based on your virtue."

'Dialogical Estoppel: As can be seen, the heart of the idea behind legal estoppel is the idea of consistency. A similar concept, “dialogical estoppel,” can be used to justify the libertarian conception of rights, because of the reciprocity inherent in the libertarian tenet that force is legitimate only in response to force. The basic insight behind this theory of rights is that a person cannot consistently object to being punished if he has himself initiated force. He is (dialogically) “estopped” from asserting the impropriety of the force used to punish him, because of his own coercive behavior. This theory also establishes the validity of the libertarian conception of rights as being strictly negative rights against aggression, the initiation of force. The point where punishment needs to be justified is when we attempt to inflict punishment upon a person who opposes the punishment. Thus, using a philosophical, generalized version of “dialogical” estoppel, I want to justify punishment in just this situation, by showing that an aggressor is estopped from objecting to his punishment. Under the principle of dialogical estoppel, or simply estoppel for short, a person is estopped from making certain claims during discourse if these claims are inconsistent and contradictory. To say that a person is estopped from making certain claims means that the claims cannot even possibly be right, because they are contradictory. It is to recognize that his assertion is simply wrong because it is contradictory. Applying estoppel in such a manner perfectly complements the very purpose of dialogue. Dialogue, discourse, or argument—terms which are used interchangeably herein—is by its nature an activity aimed at finding truth. Anyone engaged in argument is necessarily endeavoring to discern the truth about some particular subject; to the extent this is not the case, there is no dialogue occurring, but mere babbling or even physical fighting. Nor can this be denied. Anyone engaging in argument long enough to deny that truth is the goal of discourse contradicts himself, because he is himself asserting or challenging the truth of a given proposition. Thus, the assertion as true of anything that simply cannot be true is incompatible with the very purpose of discourse. Anything that cannot be true is contrary to the truth-finding purpose of discourse, and thus is not permissible within the bounds of the discourse. And contradictions are certainly the archetype of propositions that cannot be true. A and not-A cannot both be true at the same time and in the same respect. This is why participants in discourse must be consistent. If an arguer need not be consistent, truth-finding cannot occur. And just as the traditional legal theory of estoppel mandates a sort of consistency in a legal context, the more general use of estoppel can be used to require consistency in discourse. The theory of estoppel that I propose is nothing more than a convenient way to apply the requirement of consistency to arguers, to those engaged in discourse, dialogue, debate, discussion, or argument. Because discourse is a truth-finding activity, any such contradictory claims should be disregarded, they should not be heard, since they cannot possibly be true. Dialogical estoppel is thus a rule of discourse that rules out of bounds any inconsistent, mutually contradictory claims, because they are contrary to the very goal of discourse. This rule is based solely on the recognition that discourse is a truth-seeking activity and that contradictions, which are necessarily untrue, are incompatible with discourse and thus should not be allowed. The validity of this rule is undeniable, because it is necessarily presupposed by any participant in discourse.'

"The individual is pathologized so that society can be termed healthy." - '...a way forward for society that does not require the drugging of helpless children and badly informed adults.' - "What we call mental illness is injury to the brain that results from its repetitively incorrect usage."

Ayn Rand usedthe word “axiom” in this way: An axiom is a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it. In this sense, Rand’s “axioms” resemble Misesian/Kantian “apriori” concepts the denial of which leads to self-contradiction. For this reason alone, it’s better to refer to the non-aggression principle instead of the non-aggression axiom. -- Confusion has arisen, I believe, because of failure to treat separately self-ownership and ownership of external objects. Property in one’s body is based on the fact that each person has the best link to his body, because of his direct control over his body. Property in external objects is based on Lockean homesteading, where first use, or original appropriation (“embordering,” as Hoppe refers to it), serves as the link between agent and resource.'

'It's the greatest, most intimidating and most condemnatory phrase they can ever utter against you. The context for this phrase is, "You won't do what I want. You won't do this for me. You're selfish. How awful you are!" But if selfishness is so bad, then why is it acceptable for the person accusing you of it to want you to do something? Nobody calls you selfish unless they want something from you, something they consider the better option. This elevates the other person’s evaluation, want or need above your own. It’s selfish of them to not want you to be selfish, according to their own definition and standards. The moment somebody says you're selfish, and therefore bad or wrong, is the moment the person making this accusation contradicts him- or herself. This should discredit the complaint upon arrival. -- The number one flaw among human beings is an unhealthy and improper desire to control others. The primary means of controlling others ... is through unearned guilt.'

"If you really love someone, you owe it them to correct their crazy... You owe them an intervention if you want to continue to claim you love them."

'The primary social evil of our time is lack of respect for self-ownership rights. Self-ownership is rendered meaningless if the right to own private property is not also respected. The unique relationship between a person and "his" body — his direct and immediate control over the body, and the fact that, at least in some sense, a body is a given person and vice versa ... is what constitutes the objective link sufficient to give that person better title to his body than any third party claimant, even his parents... Any outsider who claims another's body cannot deny this objective link and its special status, since the outsider also necessarily presupposes this in his own case. This is so because in seeking dominion over the other, in asserting ownership over the other's body, he has to presuppose his own ownership of his body, which demonstrates he does place a certain significance on this link, at the same time that he disregards the significance of the other's link to his own body.'

'To say a person is estopped from making certain claims means that ... he will not be heard to make a statement which is flatly inconsistent with his earlier behaviour (and which another relied upon). Principled application of the estoppel principle would result in a free society. For all coercive crimes could be: punished (if not by the state, then at least by victims or their agents or defenders); and all non-coercive "crimes" could not be enforced. Since an arguer is estopped from denying the validity of estoppel in general, he must accept its validity—and he must also accept the validity of the results of its application. [This] framework establishes the validity of the libertarian nonaggression principle, which has been shown by many others to justify a libertarian or at least a minimalist or night-watchman state. Thus, everyone "must" accept the validity of the free society; to urge otherwise is to argue for inconsistency, and to be inconsistent, and to necessarily be wrong.'

'When a religious person is told that there is no God, what he hears is, “My parents lied to me.” A thinker cannot logically differentiate the nonexistence of a deity from the nonexistence of any other thing which does not exist. All con artists operate by affirming a general rule, and then creating an exception for themselves. A thief wants everyone to respect property rights except him; a counterfeiter wants everyone to accept the value of money except him—and a philosophical con man wants everyone to reject truth except for his own propositions. Don't fall for it, not for a minute! The moment an agnostic says, "Gods may exist in another dimension,” immediately identify the principle behind his statement, which is that no truth can be stated, and apply it to his own statement, thus rendering it invalid. To create a singular exception to a universal rule for that which makes you uncomfortable, rather than just admitting your discomfort, is dishonest and cowardly.'

'A performative contradiction arises when the propositional content of a statement contradicts the noncontingent presuppositions that make possible the performance of the speech act, such as occurs with "all statements must be false." In Jürgen Habermas's usage of the concept, a performative contradiction is a lack of fit between the content and the performance of a speech act. For Habermas, the truth of statements is a central element to his communicational ethic, implying that a statement which does not contradict the performance of the statement but its truthfulness is considered as a performative contradiction too. The above example "all statements must be false" is a performative contradiction because the speaker performs the action of stating something that contradicts the truthfulness of the speech act.'

'"Argumentation ethics" is a defense of libertarian rights. Hoppe asserts that argumentation, or discourse, is by its nature a conflict-free way of interacting and requires individual control of resources [the body]; thus, he argues, certain norms are presupposed as true by anyone engaging in genuine discourse. These norms include the libertarian principle of non-aggression, which itself implies libertarian rights. Therefore, no one can argumentatively deny libertarian rights without self-contradiction. Kinsella's "estoppel" theory draws on Hoppe. Kinsella argues that an aggressor cannot coherently object to being punished for the act of aggression, by the victim or the victim's agents or heirs, i.e. he is "estopped" from withholding consent, because by committing aggression he commits himself to the proposition that the use of force is legitimate, and therefore, his withholding consent based on his right not to be physically harmed contradicts his aggressive legitimation of force.'

"I consider rights to be libertarian form of religion. ...anybody who believes in a government says, “I have the right to protection from aggression, so I want a government.” And the first thing the government does, of course, is aggress against you to take your money in order to protect you, your property ‘rights’ and your ‘right’ to live without aggression. And so this is a self-detonating statement. I would say that it’s all nonsense and the reason people say that is, when you are a child, you do have just claim to protection and food and love from your parents. And I think that people take that expectation into the adult world. But ‘rights’ don’t exist and any attempt to enforce them using a government is a fundamental contradiction, a performative contradiction because you’re saying, “these rights are inviolate, universal and precious, and therefore they need to be violated by a small group of individuals in perpetuity” – and that doesn’t make any sense.”

'...the praxeological impossibility of "universal communism," as Rothbard referred to this proposal, brings me immediately to an alternative way of demonstrating the idea of original appropriation and private property as the only correct solution to the problem of social order. Whether or not persons have any rights and, if so, which ones, can only be decided in the course of argumentation (propositional exchange). Justification—proof, conjecture, refutation—is argumentative justification. Anyone who denied this proposition would become involved in a performative contradiction because his denial would itself constitute an argument. Even an ethical relativist would have to accept this first proposition, which is referred to accordingly as the apriori of argumentation. ...by virtue of the fact of being alive property rights to other things must be presupposed as valid, too. No one who is alive can possibly argue otherwise.'

'A short example of how to use a universal theory of ethics to prove the validity of property rights.' -- “It is impossible to argue against property without using property.”

'Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof. The reason that scientists do not need a government is that scientists have an objective methodology for resolving disputes: the scientific method. The reason that language does not need a central authority to guide its evolution is that it relies on the “free market” of accumulated individual preferences for style and utility. The reason that modern morality – and morality throughout history – has always had to rely first on the bullying of children, and then on the threatening of adults, is that it is a manipulative lie masquerading as a virtuous truth. The truth is that we need morality; the lie is that gods or governments can rationally define or justly enforce it. My goal in this book is to define a methodology for validating moral theories that is objective, consistent, clear, rational, empirical – and true. -- ...the primary danger to human beings is not the individual criminal, but irrational and exploitive moral theories.'

'APPENDIX D: EVERY UPB DEBATE I’VE EVER HAD… UPB Sceptic: UPB is invalid. Me: How do you know? UPB Sceptic: It's not proven! Me: So “proof” is UPB? UPB Sceptic: No, nothing is UPB. Me: Isn't the statement "nothing is UPB" UPB? UPB Sceptic: No, that's not what I'm saying at all! I'm saying that UPB is invalid! Me: Why? UPB Sceptic: Because it's false! Me: So presenting true arguments is UPB? UPB Sceptic: No! Me: So there's nothing wrong with false arguments? UPB Sceptic: No. Me: Then why are you opposing a false argument? UPB Sceptic: Oh, it's just my personal preference. I just dislike falsehood. Me: So you're arguing for a merely personal preference? UPB Sceptic: Sure! Me: So why should your personal preference take precedence over mine? I like UPB, you don't – and why bother debating personal preferences at all? UPB Sceptic: Oh - because UPB is invalid! Me: Why is it invalid? UPB Sceptic: Because it's self-contradictory! Me: So consistency is UPB? UPB Sceptic: No!'