'The 19th-century economist and social philosopher Henry George developed the theory of the business or trade cycle based on malspeculation in land value, although he did not use that term. Such malspeculation would not occur in a pure free market, thus the “business” cycle should more accurately be called "the interventionist cycle" or "the economic distortion cycle." There are two major interventions that cause malspeculation. First is an injection of money into the banking system, an increase in loanable funds not caused by higher savings but by money expansion. The resultant cheap credit fuels both malinvestment and malspeculation in real estate. When the money injections stop, interest rates rise back up, and such projects and purchases slow down and stop. When land values stop rising, speculators sell, and the fall in land values brings down the financial sector that provided the mortgages. Malspeculation carries land values beyond that warranted by the rents. Henry George called this a lockout of labor and capital. With the use of real estate now unprofitable and unaffordable, land values crash. -- The boom-bust real estate and economic distortion cycles have repeated for that past 200 years, yet the 2008 crash surprised not just malspeculators but also economists, financial analysts, and governmental officials. The reason the cycle recurs is that, as the philosopher Hegel observed, people do not learn from history. Or they learn the wrong lessons. They shun Georgist theory, and thus become mal-economists, mal-financiers, and mal-authorities. Add “malspeculation” to your dictionary. Malspeculation is a vital concept that curiously has not had a name, because the role of land in the boom-bust cycle has not been appreciated. The Crash of 2008 was caused by malspeculation, and so the word will find the light of day.'

'Like all cartels, the unconscious combination of land speculators creates a "price umbrella" under which new resources enter the market. Students of cartels recognize a "price-umbrella syndrome". Cartels create an artificial scarcity of a resource or product and an artificially high "price umbrella" to shelter new competitors who come from outside the cartel. Previously marginal or untapped resources enter the market, often irreversibly. In urban growth, the cycle periodically thus creates an artificial surplus of half-developed land (graded, perhaps, roaded, platted, but lacking buildings). Other new land is even less than half-developed: accessed by new freeways, state highways, or county roads, but not even subdivided. At the same time, the lavish use of durable capital to bring settlers to all this marginal land creates a shortage of liquid capital, a shortage of loanable and investible funds, a rise of interest rates and a tightening of credit. The writer has analyzed elsewhere this lavish, irreversible misallocation of capital (Gaffney, 1976). Austrian cycle theorists have dwelt on this tilting of what they call "the structure of production", with too much capital getting sunk irrecoverably in what they call "higher order" goods. Well and good, they are onto something big and vital. Unfortunately, though, they find its cause solely in "forced saving" from bank expansion, with no reference at all to its "geo-economic" roots, and the role of inflated land collateral enabling bank expansion. Worst of all, they see no remedy except forcing down wage rates. -- Skeptics will wonder how we can take more taxes from rents when they are falling. Here is the key: the effect of untaxing trade, capital formation, enterprise, labor, and production is to raise and sustain land and resource rents as a tax base. This does not work through raising asking and holdout prices, but rather by raising bid prices, activating the market.'

'Socio-economics recognizes that the market process includes both competition and cooperation. It encompasses institutions as well as individual behavior, and recognizes sympathy with others as an important human motivator along with self-interest. Socio-economics views rationality more broadly than the narrow rational-expectations approach of neoclassical economics. Socio-economics encompasses both economic reality (positive economics) and social justice (normative economics). The moral dimension of socio-economics is in tune with the geoclassical economics of Henry George, who melded economics and ethics. To George, there is a harmony between morality and economic efficiency, since the policy that maximizes productivity is also morally just. That geoist policy is the full ownership of wages by the worker and the equal distribution of land rent either as dividends or for public revenue. A key interest of socio-economists such as Robert Ashford has been the failure of economics to perform to their maximum productive capacity, with unutilized labor and underutilized land and capital goods. Georgist economics explains why this occurs. Land speculation, pricing land at expected higher future values, prices land too high for current investment, causing investment to slump. Secondly, taxes on labor and enterprise create an excess burden of misallocated resources. Third, central-bank-distorted interest rates create artificial stimuli that create the waste of unprofitable real-estate development. All these distortions prevent the full use of labor and other resources.'

'The geo-economic remedy for the cycle is the public collection of rent (PCR), also known as land-value taxation (LVT). When future rents are collected, the profit is taken away from real-estate speculation. The Austrian remedy for credit manipulation is free banking (Selgin, 1988), a banking system without a central bank, with unrestricted branches and with competitive private bank notes ("money substitutes" redeemable into base money such as gold or a frozen quantity of federal reserve notes). Hence, the geo-Austrian policy to eliminate the major business cycle would be the combination of PCR/LVT and free banking. The collection of the land rent by governments or by voluntary civic associations (Foldvary, 1994) would also provide revenue without interfering with price and profit signals, and without hampering the entrepreneurs who, in Austrian theory, play a key role in economic advancement. -- The 18-year cycle in the US and similar cycles in other countries gives the geo-Austrian cycle theory predictive power: the next major bust, 18 years after the 1990 downturn, will be around 2008, if there is no major interruption such as a global war.'

'...where the biases of individuals enter into market transactions, potentially changing the perception of fundamentals of the economy. -- A current example of reflexivity in modern financial markets is that of the debt and equity of housing markets. Lenders began to make more money available to more people in the 1990s to buy houses. More people bought houses with this larger amount of money, thus increasing the prices of these houses. Lenders looked at their balance sheets which not only showed that they had made more loans, but that their equity backing the loans—the value of the houses, had gone up (because more money was chasing the same amount of housing, relatively). Thus they lent out more money because their balance sheets looked good... This was further amplified by public policy. Many governments see home ownership as a positive outcome and so [grant first home owners with financial subsidies such as the exemption of a primary residence from capital gains taxation.]'

Gisted -- Harrison breaks the cycle down into 5 phases: #1 RECOVERY (7 yrs): After the previous crash, optimism returns. #2 MINI-RECESSION (A few months): Will typically bring calls for lower rates and tax cuts. #3 EXPLOSIVE (7 yrs): Low rates, mortgage tax breaks and loose lending terms combine to fuel speculation. Greed eventually overwhelms fear of being left off the property ladder. People con themselves into believing houses are an 'investment' rather than just a place to live. #4 WINNERS CURSE (The last 2 yrs): Wild enthusiasm for capital gains. Property must be acquired at any price cursing everyone with unsustainably high valuations. #5 CORRECTION (3–5 yrs): Mortgages default. Risk is perceived again. Banks tighten up; liquidity/credit/money dries up. Banks sell repossessed inventory at low prices. Prices are driven down. Mortgage holders who bought during the bubble now expect capital losses. Renters switch from renting into buying setting the stage for the next recovery.

"How does Harrison do it? Well, he uses an 18 year cycle. He has traced and verified the length of this cycle going all the way back to 1700. For Harrison, the length of the cycle arises partly from how homes are financed. He points out that 5% has been a normal mortgage interest rate for much of Britain's past and that 5% compounded will double in almost exactly 14 years. After a period of 14 years, property prices reach a level where prices are too high and rental yields are too low. When banks have exhausted all their tricks in finding ways to make prices look affordable, the high valuations choke off demand and once the peak is in place, the 3–5 year slide begins which brings prices back down to earth. The timeframe for the downturn is shorter because it operates on fear rather than greed. After the turn, increasing fear and bank tightening of lending terms destroys excessive valuations faster than greed built them up."