'Estoppel in English law is a doctrine that may be used in certain situations to prevent a person from relying upon certain rights, or upon a set of facts (e.g. words said or actions performed) which is different from an earlier set of facts. #Promissory estoppel is the doctrine that prevents a party from acting in a certain way because the first party promised not to, and the second party relied on that promise and acted upon it. In English law, a promise made without consideration is generally not enforceable, and is known as a gratuitous promise. For example, a car salesman promises not to sell a car over the weekend, but does so, the promise cannot be enforced. If however, the car salesman accepts one penny in consideration for the promise, the promise is binding and enforceable in court. Estoppel is one of the exceptions to this rule. Promissory estoppel requires (1) an unequivocal promise by words or conduct, (2) a change in position of the promisee as a result of the promise (not necessarily to their detriment), (3) inequity if the promisor were to go back on the promise. Estoppel is "a shield not a sword" – it cannot be used as the basis of an action on its own. It also does not extinguish rights. -- #Estoppel by acquiescence: The doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence may prevail when Party A makes legal notice to Party B of Party A's assertion of a fact or legal principle or claim, and Party B fails to refute, reply to, or to defend (within "a reasonable period of time") against said claim. In this circumstance, Party B is said to have acquiesced to the claim or position taken by Party A, and by acquiescence, generally is considered to have lost the legal right to make a counterclaim.'

'Sometimes an unscrupulous adversary lulls another into a false sense of security and inaction, and then seeks to capitalize on technicalities implicated thereby, such as time deadlines missed by the unsuspecting victim. Fortunately Virginia courts are empowered to resolve such injustices based on equity instead of on legal technicalities. “Courts of equity will not permit a party by his or her words and conduct to manipulate judicial proceedings in a manner that will work an injustice by inducing the adverse party not to defend the cause. Estoppel by conduct, whereby a party will not be heard to deny that which he has induced others to rely upon as true, extends without limit throughout the law.” Emrich v. Emrich, 9 Va. App. 288, 293-294 (1989).' -- Consequences will never be the same.

'Dialogical Estoppel: As can be seen, the heart of the idea behind legal estoppel is the idea of consistency. A similar concept, “dialogical estoppel,” can be used to justify the libertarian conception of rights, because of the reciprocity inherent in the libertarian tenet that force is legitimate only in response to force. The basic insight behind this theory of rights is that a person cannot consistently object to being punished if he has himself initiated force. He is (dialogically) “estopped” from asserting the impropriety of the force used to punish him, because of his own coercive behavior. This theory also establishes the validity of the libertarian conception of rights as being strictly negative rights against aggression, the initiation of force. The point where punishment needs to be justified is when we attempt to inflict punishment upon a person who opposes the punishment. Thus, using a philosophical, generalized version of “dialogical” estoppel, I want to justify punishment in just this situation, by showing that an aggressor is estopped from objecting to his punishment. Under the principle of dialogical estoppel, or simply estoppel for short, a person is estopped from making certain claims during discourse if these claims are inconsistent and contradictory. To say that a person is estopped from making certain claims means that the claims cannot even possibly be right, because they are contradictory. It is to recognize that his assertion is simply wrong because it is contradictory. Applying estoppel in such a manner perfectly complements the very purpose of dialogue. Dialogue, discourse, or argument—terms which are used interchangeably herein—is by its nature an activity aimed at finding truth. Anyone engaged in argument is necessarily endeavoring to discern the truth about some particular subject; to the extent this is not the case, there is no dialogue occurring, but mere babbling or even physical fighting. Nor can this be denied. Anyone engaging in argument long enough to deny that truth is the goal of discourse contradicts himself, because he is himself asserting or challenging the truth of a given proposition. Thus, the assertion as true of anything that simply cannot be true is incompatible with the very purpose of discourse. Anything that cannot be true is contrary to the truth-finding purpose of discourse, and thus is not permissible within the bounds of the discourse. And contradictions are certainly the archetype of propositions that cannot be true. A and not-A cannot both be true at the same time and in the same respect. This is why participants in discourse must be consistent. If an arguer need not be consistent, truth-finding cannot occur. And just as the traditional legal theory of estoppel mandates a sort of consistency in a legal context, the more general use of estoppel can be used to require consistency in discourse. The theory of estoppel that I propose is nothing more than a convenient way to apply the requirement of consistency to arguers, to those engaged in discourse, dialogue, debate, discussion, or argument. Because discourse is a truth-finding activity, any such contradictory claims should be disregarded, they should not be heard, since they cannot possibly be true. Dialogical estoppel is thus a rule of discourse that rules out of bounds any inconsistent, mutually contradictory claims, because they are contrary to the very goal of discourse. This rule is based solely on the recognition that discourse is a truth-seeking activity and that contradictions, which are necessarily untrue, are incompatible with discourse and thus should not be allowed. The validity of this rule is undeniable, because it is necessarily presupposed by any participant in discourse.'

'To say a person is estopped from making certain claims means that ... he will not be heard to make a statement which is flatly inconsistent with his earlier behaviour (and which another relied upon). Principled application of the estoppel principle would result in a free society. For all coercive crimes could be: punished (if not by the state, then at least by victims or their agents or defenders); and all non-coercive "crimes" could not be enforced. Since an arguer is estopped from denying the validity of estoppel in general, he must accept its validity—and he must also accept the validity of the results of its application. [This] framework establishes the validity of the libertarian nonaggression principle, which has been shown by many others to justify a libertarian or at least a minimalist or night-watchman state. Thus, everyone "must" accept the validity of the free society; to urge otherwise is to argue for inconsistency, and to be inconsistent, and to necessarily be wrong.'

'"Argumentation ethics" is a defense of libertarian rights. Hoppe asserts that argumentation, or discourse, is by its nature a conflict-free way of interacting and requires individual control of resources [the body]; thus, he argues, certain norms are presupposed as true by anyone engaging in genuine discourse. These norms include the libertarian principle of non-aggression, which itself implies libertarian rights. Therefore, no one can argumentatively deny libertarian rights without self-contradiction. Kinsella's "estoppel" theory draws on Hoppe. Kinsella argues that an aggressor cannot coherently object to being punished for the act of aggression, by the victim or the victim's agents or heirs, i.e. he is "estopped" from withholding consent, because by committing aggression he commits himself to the proposition that the use of force is legitimate, and therefore, his withholding consent based on his right not to be physically harmed contradicts his aggressive legitimation of force.'

'Estoppel in its broadest sense is a legal term referring to a series of legal and equitable doctrines that preclude "a person from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers, or by his own deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied."' -- Maxim of Law(?): Equitable estoppel applies to a contract created by fraud.

#Fraud lies hid in general expressions. #It is a fraud to conceal a fraud. #Once a fraud, always a fraud. #What otherwise is good and just, if it be sought by force and fraud, becomes bad and unjust. #He is not deceived who knows himself to be deceived. #Let him who wishes to be deceived, be deceived. #The propriety of words is the safety of property.