"The place where I think Sloman is misguided is in his formulation of scientific models in an either/or way, as if, in truth, social variables are linked in simple causal paths, with a scientific goal of figuring out if A causes B or the reverse. I don't know much about intelligence, beer consumption, and socioeconomic status, but I certainly don't see any simple relationships between income, religious attendance, party identification, and voting--and I don't see how a search for such a pattern will advance our understanding, at least given current techniques. I'd rather start with description and then go toward causality following the approach of economists and statisticians by thinking about potential interventions one at a time. I'd love to see Sloman's and Pearl's ideas of the interplay between observational and experimental data developed in a framework that is less strongly tied to the notion of choice among simple causal structures."

"First, note the non-negative aspects of the study. Stereotypes take another hit as gamers have an average age of 35, and are implicitly equally divided by gender. (Yes, I still get academics telling me gamers are only teen males) Will these get media attention?

Second, the technological determinism. Gaming drives depression and bad BMI, it seems, less than games being chosen as art or entertainment by those with such conditions. One wonders if the social ostracism attached to depression and obesity points one towards a cultural artifact with a bad cultural reputation."

"... Moreover, in order to raise capital and extend their credit over the long, unpredictable term of [an item's] market life, they often endorsed or guaranteed each other's promissory notes, in this way creating elaborate networks of mutual dependence. As a result, when one firm became insolvent, it often took several others down with it. But to make things even worse, many [brokers of these items] estimated their net worth based on unsold (and devalued) inventory rather than on a more realistic accounting of their assets. This meant that, at any given time, it was difficult for a [broker of these items] to know either his own true financial position or that of the firms whose notes he'd endorsed. Thus, by 1819, with many thousands of worthless [items] circulating as inflated currency, the bankruptcy of a [broker of these items] was a frequent occurrence."

via Cosma Shalizi