On the Run in Siberia is the chilling tale of living in exile among Yukaghir hunters in the stark Siberian taiga region—a story of idealism, political corruption, starvation, and survival. It is also a striking portrait of the Yukaghirs’ shamanistic tradition and their threatened way of life, a drama unfolding daily in one of the world’s coldest, most enthralling landscapes.

This paper discusses the complex relationship between morals and markets and uses the case of Nantucket as an illustration. I argue that it was a specific Protestant work ethic promoted by Quakerism that facilitated the rise of Nantucket to become the capital of the American whaling fleet for more than a century. However, I also argue that the same morals and values that helped to give birth to the Quaker whaling empire contributed significantly to the downfall of the Quaker community, decades before whaling in general got into crisis. In more general terms this paper attempts to be a historical case study that illustrates the complexities of Albert O. Hirschman's doux commerce argument and particularly the way the Protestant spirit fits into Hirschman's explanation.

This article examines the way ordinary members of the public, who were present at the celebrations for the 2011 UK royal wedding, were constructed in the televised coverage of the event on the BBC and ITV. It draws on theories of media events and on theories of the mediated construction of the views of ordinary citizens, and focuses on the way vox-pop interviews and inferences about what the public thinks were used by the two television channels. It argues that by presenting the people on the scene of the celebrations as a homogenized group which thought and acted as one, by inferring what was in the mind of this group and what they would say if they spoke, and by allowing individual members of the public relatively little flexibility in expressing themselves in their own terms during vox-pops, the coverage contributed to a dramatization of the event and at the same time constructed public acceptance of the centrality and significance of the day. Moreover these techniques functioned as an invitation to the viewer of the broadcast to identify with the group, its thoughts and emotions.

Bruce Schneier!

This article describes how contemporary psychoanalytic and poststructuralist theories inform my teaching of writing. It suggests that the psychological and academic challenges confronting freshmen recently placed in a new social/academic environment may be abated by a pedagogy that highlights a poststructuralist understanding of identity as multiple and performative.

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Simmel says the content of experience does not make the adventure, the form does! To help clarify this remark, the Simmelian adventurer here is recast, following leads from Mead, Burke, and the pragmatists, as an ephemeral role incumbent engaged in symbolic work. The adventure is presented in terms of symbolic conversions of the content of life's experiences—physical things, social things, events, and persons—into objects of adventure. The form of experiencing engages the adventurer in symbolic work in which she or he symbolically synthesizes, antagonizes, and compromises Simmel's fundamental categories of life: certainty-uncertainty, chance-necessity, and passivity-activity.

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This paper explores processes of self-identification and constructions of historical memory among the Bene Ephraim of Andhra Pradesh, a community of former Madiga untouchables who came to practising Judaism in the late 1980s. Our discussion is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2009–2010, in-depth interviews, and an analysis of written sources on the history of the Bene Ephraim produced by community leaders. We consider the case study of the Bene Ephraim in the context of broader academic discussions about the universalist and particularist dimensions of the Jewish tradition and suggest that this movement illuminates both the exclusive/genealogical and the inclusive aspects of Judaism. We argue that though the perceived “ethnocentricity” of Judaism may have been the basic logic for the emergence of the Bene Ephraim movement, it nevertheless resulted in the development of groups demonstrating syncretic practices and diverse modes of engagement with the Jewish tradition.

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Over the last 40 years museums have become important sites to understand the politics and poetics of heritage management, display, and knowledge production. The books under consideration here all help demonstrate how museums as relational entities—containing dynamic relations between persons and things, as well as generating them—are emergent processes. Each work helps demonstrate why museums in their many guises remain critical terrains for the negotiation of identity, history, and culture in the push for more collaborative accounts of our world and the circulation and display of things.

In lectures delivered to psychologists in the 1920s and 1930s, Marcel Mauss argued for a rapprochement between sociology and psychology. His goal was not disciplinary unification, but rather a more holistic sociology that recognized the mutual constitution of the body and mind, and the effects of society on the embodied person. Following a review of main points from Mauss’s lectures, I critically review several research programs that are advancing in directions similar to those Mauss advocated: cognitive science research on embodied cognition; psychology studies of cross-cultural differences in perception and emotional expression; and sociological studies of moral cultures. I argue that these research programs provide firm support for positions developed in Mauss’s lectures, and that, therefore, Mauss’s ideas provide a useful template on which future sociological studies of culture, mind, and body can be built.

The primary goal of this article is to uncover the deep-seated conceptual affinities between Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias. The second goal is to demonstrate that, in part because of their diverging sensitivities, when taken together the two authors’ highly compatible approaches yield a vision more fertile than either of their sociological perspectives considered separately. Tracing the intellectual roots of the two author’s three core concepts – habitus, field/figuration, and power/capital – we show how they selectively appropriated from their predecessors. We then outline how each of the two authors used their overlapping triadic approaches to interrogate a range of empirical phenomena. Attempting to make the authors’ unexploited complementarity more tangible, we reflect on a simultaneously Elias- and Bourdieu-inspired approach to the body-centred world of sport. The conclusion argues that looking back at Elias and Bourdieu’s theoretical contributions together can revitalize our conceptualizing and investigating of human societies in the future.

To make sense of the complexity of the world so that they can act, individuals and institutions need to develop simplified, self-consistent versions of that world. The process of doing so means that much of what is known about the world needs to be excluded from those versions, and in particular that knowledge which is in tension or outright contradiction with those versions must be expunged. This is ‘uncomfortable knowledge’. The paper describes four implicit strategies which institutions use to keep uncomfortable knowledge at bay: denial, dismissal, diversion and displacement. It concludes by suggesting that ‘clumsy’ arrangements may need to be constructed to ensure that uncomfortable knowledge is not excluded from policy debates, especially when dealing with ‘wicked problems’ where the accepted version excludes knowledge that is crucial for making sense of and addressing the problem.

This article seeks to investigate which kind of educational ethos would be most appropriate for a cosmopolitan Europe. It rejects the idea of the world citizen and narrow forms of nationalism for a genuinely European cosmopolitanism that seeks to learn the lessons of Europe’s often violent past while seeking to develop an education that is implicitly concerned with questions of democracy and human rights in its contents as well as its practice. Drawing on critical debates that inform the work of Adorno, Giroux, Levinas, Nussbaum and others, the article seeks to uncover the necessary ambivalences in a educative practice that is fearful of silencing the Other and cancelling complex pedagogic relationships, while at the same time wishing to uphold democratic versions of citizenship.

The Post-Secular in Question considers whether there has in fact been a religious resurgence of global dimensions in recent decades. This collection of original essays by leading academics represents an interdisciplinary intervention in the continuing and ever-transforming discussion of the role of religion and secularism in today’s world. Foregrounding the most urgent and compelling questions raised by the place of religion in the social sciences, past and present, The Post-Secular in Question restores religion to a more central place in social scientific thinking about the world, helping to move scholarship “beyond unbelief.”

Contributors: Courtney Bender, Craig Calhoun, Michele Dillon, Philip S. Gorski, Richard Madsen, Kathleen Mahoney, Tomoko Masuzawa, Eduardo Mendieta, John Schmalzbauer, James K. A. Smith, John Torpey, Bryan S. Turner, Hent de Vries.

We live in a world in which ever-greater arenas of social life are shaped by standardization and bureaucratic rationalization, as the pursuit of ‘measurable results’ sweeps everything from universities to hospitals to international organizations. Yet intuitively we understand that much of our collective and individual existence escapes these efforts of rationalization. How then do we develop a conception of the social world that appreciates both the powerful drive towards rationalization and the things that escape or overflow? This article seeks to answer this riddle by examining the central role of ambiguity in social life in general – and in organizational practice in particular. The concept of ambiguity is implicit in much social theory. Yet, over time, as theories become established, much of their openness to tension and ambiguity tends to be closed off. This article seeks to recapture some of that messiness, to shift the focus of attention slightly and to look at what slips out, does not fit or gets lost in translation. Drawing on the examples of two international organizations – the IMF and the World Bank – I explore the ways in which bureaucracies seek not only to contain ambiguity through various forms of quantification and standardization, but also to foster it.

The financial crisis of 2007–8 was experienced and reflected upon as a crisis of knowledge, the perennial question being why nobody accurately understood the risks that were being taken within the financial sector. In the wake of the crisis, there have been demands that rational economic knowledge be extended further and more vigorously, to prevent such ignorance being possible in future. At the same time, there have been demands for a new, softer rationalism, which factors in the possibility of errors and systemic complexities. What neither approach recognizes is that ignorance is not simply the absence of rational economic knowledge, but is a productive force in itself, something that is actively nurtured and exploited, both by neo-liberal theorists such as Hayek and by expert actors who have been implicated in the financial crisis. We explore how ignorance has been alternately an albatross, a commodity and an institutional alibi to financial actors and the scholars who study them.

This paper exhorts geographers to give critical attention to the super-rich, defined as individuals with investable assets in excess of $1 million. The super-rich currently number almost 11 million globally (2011) and have collective wealth in excess of $42 trillion. We argue that as a result of our discipline's typical, and not unjustifiable, focus on the poor and middle class, and our neglect of the super-rich, geographers may both be overlooking potentially valuable insights to the institutions, practices, and cultural values of our society and gaining only a partial view of global capitalism. We point to prospectively useful work in areas that embrace relationships between the super-rich, place, and mobility; links between wealth and (geo)politics; new philanthropy; and the social and environmental consequences of ‘luxury fever’. We also speculate as to some of the reasons for geographers’ apparent reluctance to engage with the super-rich, responding to some of the critical methodological challenges associated with such work.

The opening decade of this millennium witnessed genome scientists, policy makers, critical race theorists and world leaders standing together to pronounce the anti-racist democratic potential of human genomics. Understanding and assessing this rise of ‘anti-racist, democratic genomics’ requires distinguishing between two problems of power and science: the first characterized by what Michel Foucault labeled states of domination; the second by what he described as relations of power. When states of domination exist, as in the case of Nazi science, liberal efforts to extend new powers of participation and autonomy to research subjects may play important roles in redressing power imbalances between researchers and their subjects. However, when distinctions between scientist and research subject blur, as in the case of much human genomics, efforts to extend liberal rights to subjects of genomic studies—or genomic liberalism—may produce novel problems, including: (1) human genome scientists' loss of capacity to describe their objects of study; (2) disruption of research subjects' abilities to define themselves; and (3) lack of accountability for the unintended effects of efforts to democratize genomics. In these ways genomic liberalism may foster, at the same that it impedes, the co-constitution of knowledge and democratic subjects. It may create new forms of racism at the very moment that it explicitly seeks anti-racist ends. Addressing the problems created by this paradoxical position will require more sustained attention to and critique of the anti-racist and democratic imaginaries that increasingly animate technoscience.

This article reflects on some themes in Harrison White’s work in the context of China, where the social and cultural construction of markets is quite literal. We explore how we get markets where previously there were no markets and draw on White’s central themes of ‘uncertainty’, ‘value’ and ‘order’. We maintain a distinction, with White and with Frank Knight, of risk, on the one hand, and uncertainty, on the other, where ‘risk’ has to do with entities that are in principle insurable or calculable and ‘uncertainty’ has to do with what is not calculable/insurable. An entrepreneur’s decision to enter a market, to invest in and enter a production market, entails what White calls a ‘commitment to facilities’. This, for White and Knight, is inherently incalculable, and hence uncertain.

Hokulani Aikau

There has been much debate on ‘culturespeak’ and the politics of culture, but the bureaucratic articulation of specific representations of culture has not received much attention. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, this article presents a double take on bureaucracy. On the one hand, I focus on the outcome of UNESCO’s bureaucracy: UNESCO promotes an all-inclusive culture perspective for ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations’, but there are limits to tolerance in this culture ideology. On the other hand, I focus on the social and pragmatic adaptation to the bureaucratic field and towards UNESCO’s keywords, as they are embedded with institutional authority in everyday practice. In conclusion, I briefly situate UNESCO’s culture ideology in relation to questions of recognition and redistribution.

Reading comprehension skill is often assumed by sociology instructors, yet many college students seem to have marginal reading comprehension skills, which may explain why fewer than half of them are actually doing the reading. Sanctions that force students to either read or to pay a price are based on a rational choice model of behavior—a perspective that many students seem to bring with them. However, deep reading—reading for long-term retention of the material and for comprehension at a level that can be perspective-transforming—involves constructing meaning as one reads. Students need help developing reading strategies that enhance this process. Moreover, cost/benefit coercion of reading does not necessarily enhance construction of meaning or deep-learning; indeed, it may reward minimalist or surface reading. This essay is an excursion into theory on deep learning and the implications of that theory for engaging students in reading. An assignment based on multiple intelligences and fostering reading comprehension is suggested and some initial data are provided regarding possible success of this strategy.

Over the past decade, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY has published a number of features covering the relationship between anthropology and the security state. Here, David Price draws attention to an aborted counterinsurgency project, known as the M-VICO project. Building on the categories and structures employed in the Human Relation Area Files (HRAF), this project relied on anthropologists to encode data cross-culturally on all forms of behaviour in as many strategic localities as possible, which the security services subsequently scrutinize and probe for possible weaknesses that could be exploited. In this article, David Price shows that, in the secrecy that often surrounds the financing and precise purposes of its projects, anthropology is not all that different from many other disciplines, with some projects serving what he calls ‘dual-use’ ends. Since civilian researchers are not supposed to have full knowledge of these ends, research into these semi-covert purposes is particularly challenging.

In recent years, actor-network theory (ANT) has become an increasingly influential theoretical framework through which to analyse economic markets and organizations. Indeed, with its emphasis on the power of social and natural concrete ‘things’ to become contingently enrolled in different networks, many argue that ANT successfully draws attention to the complex intermeshing of new technologies and social actors in organizations and markets across spatial divides from the local to the global. This article argues, however, that within its own method of abstraction and research methodology, ANT separates ‘concrete’ and ‘contingent’ economic markets and organizations from their abstract, necessary and virtual capitalist form. This means that ANT will tend to over-identify with how concrete-contingent actor-networks are performed in empirical economic markets and organizations at the expense of analysing how such empirical contexts are also internally mediated through abstract capitalist processes such as that of surplus value extraction. This, in turn, creates a number of difficulties in how ANT investigates economic markets and organizations. These critical points are made by recourse to the Marxist poststructuralism of Deleuze and Guattari as well as through conventional Marxist ideas.

This article aims to demonstrate how the formation of ethical subjectivity must be considered in conjunction with the techno-politics of secrecy and disclosure, and it proposes an account of the ways in which the technical transition and ‘democratization’ of archival upload/download capacity associated with digital communications fundamentally challenges the existing structure of control over such things as censorship and cultural memory understood in terms of power of recall. It argues that it is against this background and in view of the mediality of communications that the question of responsibility with respect to secrets and their disclosure must ultimately be posed. It seeks to establish the difference between a purely political and an ethico-political understanding of the secrecy/disclosure dyad as this functions, on the one hand, in relation to philosophical inquiry itself and, on the other, in relation to normative representations of informational events, and it contextualizes its theoretical account of this difference in relation to the ‘Wikileaks phenomenon’ viewed as a disclosive event. It examines how ethical subjectivity is formed in relation to ‘information’ and in the wider context of a digital culture of archivization, characterized by the ubiquitous recording of communications of all kinds. Drawing centrally on the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, for whom ‘infinite responsibility’ is ‘incarnated’ as the ‘ultimate secret of subjectivity’ in me, and Derrida’s account of both the necessary technicity of the human and the impossibility of ‘saying the event’, it proposes a way of thinking the ethico-techno-politics of secrecy and disclosure in terms of the singularity of the event and the unique responsibility of the ethical Subject in relation to that.

This article explores men’s articulations and practices of gender through transition to first-time fatherhood. Using qualitative longitudinal data, men’s antenatal intentions and postnatal practices are explored in this study which replicates earlier research on motherhood. The contemporary context in the UK is one where paternity leave, discourses of caring masculinities and more public displays of fathering involvement appear to offer new possibilities for men. But data analysis shows that whilst opportunities to disrupt gender norms are initially imagined, longer term practices can confirm ‘patriarchal habits’. The findings illuminate gender being done and undone, at times simultaneously, as the exhaustion and hard work of new parenting is encountered. A retreat into normative behaviours can be a path of least resistance as experiences unfold in an arena where men are found to have available to them a wider repertoire of discursive storylines. Optimistically, some changes in fathering involvement are discernible.

This landmark study brings to light key overlooked documents, such as the Yalta diary of Roosevelt's daughter Anna; the intimate letters of Roosevelt's de facto chief of staff, Missy LeHand; and the wiretap transcripts of estranged adviser Harry Hopkins. With a gripping narrative and subtle analysis, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances lays out a new approach to foreign relations history. Frank Costigliola highlights the interplay between national political interests and more contingent factors, such as the personalities of leaders and the culturally conditioned emotions forming their perceptions and driving their actions. Foreign relations flowed from personal politics--a lesson pertinent to historians, diplomats, and citizens alike.

This paper proposes an approach to the question of meaning and understanding based on the idea of constitutive rules and their relationship to the social objects they are used to create. This approach implicates mutual attention as an essential aspect of the social processes constitutive of social objects and mutual intelligibility. Social objects as such include the meaning, perception and coherence of things, identities and talk, etc. There is a relatively unexplored but important line of argument in sociology that has, from the beginning, explained the coherence and mutual intelligibility of social objects and associations in terms of constitutive practices and social facts. This line of argument begins with Emile Durkheim (1893) and carries through the work of Harold Garfinkel to current studies of work and interaction, human computer interaction and talk. The argument is that we use constitutive practices (Constitutive rules or constitutive background expectancies) to create social objects and make coherent and shared meanings. To act is in this sense for Garfinkel ([1948]2006) to “mean”. Explaining the consistency of social objects and orders in terms of constitutive orders, rules, or practices is an approach that meets the challenges posed to social science and philosophy by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), Peter Winch (1958) and Paul Grice (1989).

In part because he is known through his Meditations, a short pamphlet he wrote, rightly in fear, to conciliate (unsuccessfully) with the church, and because his rationalism is misconstrued when interpreted empirically, Descartes is subject to a variety of misunderstandings. It does not help that he is dogged by a canard invented in the late 1600s and revived by the animal rights movement, a canard that was designed to denigrate the then burgeoning mechanistic new science, discovered cruelly cutting up living animals, while laughingly insisting the writhing animals feel no pain. Descartes maintained that, physically speaking, humans as well as animals are machines, but he also clearly maintained that animals feel pain and hunger, have sensory experiences, etc. As a more abstract level, 20th Century analytic empiricism revivified the attack on rationalist views. But the last half century has seen strong support (though largely unacknowledged) for Descartes’ views about cognition and perception.

Thinkers in the Zhànguó period of Chinese history debated intensely whether men were by nature “good” or “bad”. This debate has for many years been an important focus of sinological interest, but usually these properties were not attributed to men, but rather to so-called “human nature” (xìng 性) – thus, in effect, mirroring well-known (and problematic) “European” positions and discussions. The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to redirect attention to the original Zhànguó positions and to explore the reasons for their variance by offering novel and close historical readings of relevant passages, and on the other, to propose a viable historical reconstruction of the common anthropological assumptions underlying these positions by blending it with the traces of a dominant cognitive image present in the texts. This calls for a systematic rethinking of the role of hearts (in the plural), desires, and behavioural patterns in their interplay and as elements of a concept of the psychological build of human beings current in early China.

American universities today serve as economic engines, performing the scientific research that will create new industries, drive economic growth, and keep the United States globally competitive. But only a few decades ago, these same universities self-consciously held themselves apart from the world of commerce. Creating the Market University is the first book to systematically examine why academic science made such a dramatic move toward the market. Drawing on extensive historical research, Elizabeth Popp Berman shows how the government--influenced by the argument that innovation drives the economy--brought about this transformation.

Several developments in the measurement of justice have drawn on Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities. This article addresses the relationship between Sen’s theoretical work and its interpretation in the measurement of justice, in particular by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) and by the British Equality and Human Rights Commission and Government Equalities Office in its Equality Measurement Framework. It starts with a review of the diverse interpretations of Sen’s work, which range from considering it to be an innovative radical development to locating his work within the liberal tradition. Central to the article is the question of whether it is possible to develop a meaningful operationalization of Sen’s philosophical distinctions, in particular that between capabilities and functionings, so as to inform measurement frameworks. It finds that on both conceptual and methodological grounds it is not possible to sustain this distinction in practice. This is illustrated by an analysis of the changing measurement of justice in frameworks developed by the UNDP and the UK government. Changes in the content of the measurement frameworks in radical or neoliberal directions are not constrained by Sen’s theoretical analysis, despite claims that Sen’s work informs these frameworks. The openness of Sen’s work means that it can be used by forces generated by the neoliberal environment to support their redefinition of justice.

This paper interrogates the status of the Malthusian couple and the policing and government of reproduction in the first volume of Foucault's History of Sexuality, Volume I (HS1), and the associated Collège de France lectures. Presented by Foucault as one of the four ‘strategic ensembles’ of the 18th century through which knowledge and power became centered on sex, what Foucault calls the socialization of procreative sexuality (HS1: 104) also constitutes a largely invisible hinge between the trajectories in HS1: biopolitics (vector of governmentality, management, administration and intensification of life) and sex (vector through which the repressive hypothesis is rejected). Particularly because it is one of the least discussed figures in Foucauldian commentary, my argument is that a reading of HS1 through the prism of its Malthusian couple produces unexpected results. A text that can be interpreted from the perspective of (a) its debate with psychoanalysis, or (b) its potential debate with those for whom sexual rights belong to a sexual subject, or (c) its status as a watershed text for biopolitical theory, enters into a fourth dialogue with the history of reproduction as politicized and biopoliticized, a problematic to date taken up most directly by Ann Stoler in Race and the Education of Desire. This allows for a revisiting of the complex relationship between the vectors of ‘sex’ and ‘life’ in HS1. Although reproductive sex, and reproductive life, are not the themes of the strongest importance in HS1, they serve as the invisible hinge at the interface of biopolitics and sex in HS1. Considering the status of reproductive life from this perspective becomes a departure point for reconsidering the reproductive woman, in her historical role as part of the problematized Malthusian couple and at the intersection of biopolitics and thanatopolitics.

This paper is concerned with an aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought which has not been duly analyzed: systematicity. More specifically, it deals with their conception of the system in three co-authored major works: What is Philosophy?, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. These works are of renewed interest because they tease out, each in its own way, a particular type of system. Regardless of whether it has a philosophical import, a botanical reference, a social dimension, or a libidinal investment, the system that Deleuze and Guattari advocate is allegedly a hyper-dynamic system that resists closure. Thus, in an interview with Didier Eribon, Deleuze points out that philosophy is ‘an open system’ and then, referring to A Thousand Plateaus, he further observes that what he and Guattari ‘call a rhizome is also one example of an open system’. The purpose of this essay is not merely to explore how the system in the works of these two prominent poststructuralists is conceived, how it is structured, and how it works, but also to show how it is only superficially open. Paying a special attention to Deleuze and Guattari’s exegesis on capitalism, I argue that the proposed system is cynical and ultimately untenable.

Office outbursts are often associated with impulsive reactions to something that is said or done that aggravates an individual by offending his or her beliefs, expectations, sensibilities, or principles. Vengefulness is linked to needs for retribution (until satisfied) for a perceived offense. An unsettled issue is whether these antecedents are also manifested in electronic expressions known as cyber smearing. Free speech by constitution and legislation in the US, UK, EU have been held as a cherished value and basic right, but the rights to free speech are not unlimited and in fact are legally constrained to varying degrees regarding issues such as related to privacy, defamation, and harassment. Cyber smearing is a campaign waged to damage the credibility or reputation of others over the Internet. Using a randomized study we investigated rash impulsivity, vengefulness, and anonymous identity (a virtual self), as factors contributing to cyber smearing, and we found that when people who lack self-control and have tendencies to seek revenge especially when shrouded in anonymity of virtual self and concomitantly have high tendencies toward cyber smearing. We also found that those who hold the view in which ethical standards are situational and relative amplifies these cyber smearing behaviors.

This study examined the influence of gender, the Big 5 personality factors, and self-esteem on virtual self-representation in the form of avatar-self discrepancy. To examine this, participants designed characters to play in a video game, spent 20 min playing the video game, and then had their actual pictures taken. Our results indicated that, consistent with predictions, men and women generally selected self-representations consistent with ideal male and female bodies. This finding was pronounced for men and women high in agreeableness. Conversely, some results contradicted the normative prescriptions often associated with self-presentation. For instance, men did not build taller avatars than did women. Men who were high in openness to new experiences were more likely to select avatars with skin tone variations. Introverts – both male and female – and women high in neuroticism were more likely to build attractive avatars. Moreover, those with low self-esteem were more likely to select lighter skin tones than those with high self-esteem. Thus, the effects of gender and personality have considerable implications for online self-presentation and self-representation.

The World Wide Web provides a tremendously large quantity of information. When users search for information or products on the Web, they will presumably be inclined to choose their path of navigation on the basis of their prior knowledge. In those cases in which the prior knowledge of users is incorrect, however, this navigation process is assumed to lead to suboptimal search results. In an experimental study with 180 participants, we examined to what extent both the users’ prior knowledge and social tags – which capture the collective knowledge of a Web community in tag clouds – influenced the navigation of users and triggered incidental learning processes during the Web search. The results supported the assumption that the users’ prior knowledge is indeed crucial for navigation, as users followed those tags which corresponded to their internal associations. Moreover, we found that social tags also affected the navigation behavior of users, as a strong collective association of social tags led to a high selection rate for these tags. Finally, the results showed that social tags triggered incidental learning processes, as those internal associations which corresponded to tags with a strong collective association were strengthened during navigation. The implications of these findings for further research are discussed.

`Culturespeak' (Hannerz) is everywhere, but what is `loose on the streets', says Wikan, is typically an `old model' of culture, which `anthropologists have done their share to spread'. Whereas she wants to denounce this model (and reproach anthropologists for endorsing it), we should try to understand how and why, not just culture, but essentialist versions of culture have such popular grip; and why anxiety about `our' culture now seems ubiquitous, permeating much contemporary political and media rhetoric, among both `majority' and `minority' populations, and across political and religious spectra. This is a complex issue, and this article is a preliminary study, set mainly within the context of contemporary Europe, of a set of issues that require systematic, local-level, and comparative investigation. Not particularly concerned with anthropology's own internal arguments, the article ends with some pessimistic conclusions about the room for anthropological intervention in contemporary public debates about culture.

This essay takes Georg Simmel’s conceptualization of space as a form of sociation (Vergesellschaftung) in his 1908 masterpiece, Sociology, as a framework for critically re-reading two ninteetnth-century classics in the sociology of empire. Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835/1940) is shown to illustrate Simmel’s understanding of social-spatial boundaries by portraying the cultural and historical geography of America as an ‘optic space’ of racial (in)equality. Similarly, Harriett Martineau’s study of morals and manners in Society in America (1837) exemplifies Simmel’s ideas on social-spatial sensibilities with its attention to how everyday settings serve as a kind of ‘acoustic space’ of gendered (un)freedom. Drawing on related arguments by recent thinkers and critics, and rectifying the relative neglect of how socio-spatial dynamics are addressed in the texts of classical sociology, the essay examines a description in each work of a particular personal encounter with strangers which exemplifies how the spatial sense of empire disrupts assumptions that new-world democracy has superseded old-world colonialism. Considered as illustrations of Simmel’s thesis concerning the spatial orders of society, the ‘travelling and anecdotal theories’ of Martineau and Tocqueville provide ‘sociological allegories’ designed to instruct reading publics on how law, empire, and social mores constitute bounded fields of struggle within the contact zones of modern empire.

In this study we analyze Geoffrey Hodgson’s discussion of Talcott Parsons in which Hodgson presents Parsons as a little petty bourgeois, feebleminded and insecure yet opportunistic to the core. Indeed, Hodgson does his utmost to belittle Parsons’ theoretical creativity and cultivation. Hodgson’s attempt to discredit Parsons is a part of his project to ‘rehabilitate’ the German historical school and the institutionalist tradition. We argue that Hodgson’s interpretation of Parsons’ early career is seriously flawed, characterized by superficial command of the biographical data of Parsons’ life, as well as an amateurish command of his theory. Like Charles Camic’s stigmatizing narrative years before, the essence of Hodgson’s analysis is best characterized as an exercise in ‘social interest’ reification. Especially, Hodgson ignores the impact of Parsons’ childhood socialization and grossly overstates the influence Hamilton and Ayres had on Parsons and especially misrepresents their influence on Parsons’ concept of culture as well as well as creating a caricature of Parsons’ early years at Harvard.